MONEY

This is to inform all former patients of Dr. Lauersen that his practice is CLOSED.Please do not give any money to Nuala Connor a.k.a Nuala Connor Robinson.We have been advised by Dr. Lauersen's counsel that funds previously collected by Nuala Connor a.k.a Nuala Connor Robinson did not go to pay any of Dr. Lauersens lawyers or legal bills.

In Dr. Lauersen's communications he has informed us that NONE OF HIS LEGAL FEES WERE PAID BY "THE COALITION".

We have been informed by counsel as a result of the Patriot Act the government can take any moneys put into a lawyers IOLA account, personal account or any individuals bank account. The story with collecting money is that because restitution is owned, the government has first claim , so if I or anyone takes gifts and deposits those gift monies into any bank account and then uses those monies to pay a lawyer for example, the government has the right to force the person whose name appears on the bank account to repay the government the amount they paid to the lawyer claiming it is restitution moneys. Why no one before answered such a simple question is beyond me.

This means that anyone representing any organization regardless of who they say they represent will become legally responsible to repay any amounts they collected in Dr. Lauersen's behalf to the U.S. government. Ignoring this information and gifting money could result in the giftor being accused of "Conscious Avoidance".

Doctrine of Conscious Avoidance

The doctrine of conscious avoidance can play a key role as it is applied in conspiracy cases and other civil & criminal cases. The doctrine of conscious avoidance, also known as deliberate ignorance or willful blindness, has its roots in the 19th-century English legal system. See Ira P. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction: Deliberate Ignorance as a Criminal Mens Rea, 81 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 191, 196-197 (1990). According to one scholarly treatise; A court can properly find willful blindness only where it can almost be said that the defendant actually knew. He suspected the fact; he realised its probability;but he refrained from obtaining the final confirmation because he wanted in the event to be able to deny knowledge. This, and this alone, is willful blindness. Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part § 57, at 159 (2d ed. 1961).

While not without detractors, the doctrine has found fertile ground in this country where it has taken root. We believe it is a practical necessity given the ease with which a defendant could otherwise escape justice by deliberately refusing to confirm the existence of one or more facts that he believes to be true. Robbins, supra, at 192-93, 196-202.

In Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969), the Supreme Court articulated the modern doctrine of conscious avoidance by reference to the Model Penal Code. In Leary, the Court reasoned that, in addition to actual knowledge, a defendant can also be said to know a fact if he "is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist." Id. at 46 n.93. Several years later, the Ninth Circuit had occasion to explain more thoroughly the influence of the Model Penal Code on the doctrine of conscious avoidance, finding that[t]he substantive justification for the rule is that deliberate ignorance and positive knowledge are equally culpable.The textual justification is that in common understanding one "knows" facts of which he is less than absolutely certain. To act "knowingly," therefore, is not necessarily to act only with positive knowledge, but also to act with an awareness of the high probability of the existence of the fact in question. When such awareness is present, "positive" knowledge is not required. This is the analysis adopted in the Model Penal Code. United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc).

In conformity with this view, precedents establish that the doctrine may be invoked to prove defendant had knowledge of the unlawful conspiracy. But we do not permit the doctrine to be used to prove a knowing intent to participate in a conspiracy. The reason for this distinction is that common sense teaches it is logically impossible to intend and knowingly agree to join a conspiracy if a defendant does not know of its existence. Mankani, 738 F.2d at 547 n.1. Yet once defendant's participation in a conspiracy has been proved, conscious avoidance may properly be used to prove his knowledge of its unlawful objectives.

From U.S.A. v. Reyes